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(ii) 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
ARTICLE VIII §5 UTAH CONSTITUTION [JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT 
COURTS AND OTHER COURTS - RIGHT OF APPEAL] 
". . . Except for matters filed originally with the 
Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal 
of right from the Court of original jurisdiction to a 
Court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause." 
U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(d) - COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION 
" Appeals from the Circuit Courts, except those from the 
Small claims Department of a Circuit Court." 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Davis County, 
State of Utah on a criminal conviction of driving under the influence 
of alcohol. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON* APPEAL 
Whether an unidentified uncorraborated informant's tip 
established probable cause for the defendant to be stopped, 
detained and arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol? 
Whether the State is required to follow its own breath test-
ing regulations in the calibration of the intoxilyzer in accordance 
with the standards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety 
and failure to do so requires suppression of the breath testing 
record? 
Whether the affidavits proffered as evidence in satisfaction 
of the requirements of §41-6-44.3 are inadmissible because: 
1. They show on their face the affiant did 
not attest from his own personal knowledge. 
2. The affidavits are inaccurate, and, 
3. They lack an affirmative finding by the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Luis Maestas was arrested by Bountiful City Police Officer, 
Mike Boyle, for driving under the influence of alcohol after being 
stopped and detained on an informant's tip. Officer Boyle was 
conducting a routine traffic stop when two unidentified (22) in-
formants approached him and stated an individual was driving or 
had been driving intoxicated, that he had just left the Maverick 
Store after obtaining directions to the#liquor store. The infor-
mant provided the license plate number and description of the 
pickup truck being driven by the intoxicated person. (4)(21) 
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Officer Boyle completed the routine traffic stop (4)(22) and 
then proceeded to the liquor store where he saw Luis Maestas and 
Larry Martinez getting into the pickup truck matching the infor-
mant's description (5) (23) • 
Luis Maestas climbed behind the steering wheel. Officer Boyle 
contacted Luis Maestas, smelled alcohol, had Luis Maestas perform 
field sobriety test and then placed him under arrest for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. 
Luis Maestas was found guilty at a bench trial of driving 
under the influence of alcohol (72). See Order signed by the Court, 
dated 25 January 1989. This appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
An individual is protected from unreasonable searches and 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States, 
through the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. A police 
officer must have probable cause to stop and question the driver of 
a vehicle for suspicion of driving under the influence. A stop and 
detention based on an informant's tip, absent specific and arti-
cuable facts to support the informat's allegation or with the 
absence of any actual observance of erratic driving by the officer 
fails to meet the minimal standards of probable cause for detention 
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
The State is required to follow its own breath testing 
regulations in the calibration of the intoxilyzer and failure to do 
so requires suppression of the breath testing record when the 
calibration is not in accordance with the standards established by 
the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
Affidavits proffered as evidence in satisfaction of the 
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requirements of §41-6-44.3 are inadmissible because they show on 
their face the affiants do not attest from their own personal 
knowledge; the affidavits are inaccurate and they lack the affirma-
tive finding by the trial court as stated in Murray City v. Hall, 
No. 17329 Ut. Sup. Ct. (1983) . 
ARGUMENTS 
THE INFORMANT'S TIP DID NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST 
Before anyone can be arrested and charged with the crime of 
driving under the. influence of alcohol, the arresting officer must 
have probable cause to stop the vehicle, require the individual to 
perform field sobriety tests, administer a breath test or search 
the individual'a person or vehicle. 
The FOURTH AMENDMENT of the U.S. CONSTITUTION, which is 
applicable to the States through the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, protects 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, 
the police must have probable cause to stop and question the driver 
of a car for suspicion of drunk driving before such questioning and 
searches incident thereto, will be upheld. 
The issue, is whether the unidentified informant, who informed 
Bountiful City Police Officer, Mike Boyle (4), an individual had 
just left the Maverick Store that was intoxicated and had been 
driving - - or was driving and he also asked for directions towards 
the liquor store (4) establishes sufficient probable cause for 
Officer Boyle to search for and detain the vehicle and defendant 
without any other evidence of drunk driving? 
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A motorist has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the use 
of his automobile. See DELAWARE v. PROUSE, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
As the PROUSE Court stated: 
"Accordingly, we hold that except in those 
situations in which there is at least 
articulable and reasonable suspicion that 
a motorist is unlicensed or that an 
automobile is unregistered, or that either 
the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise 
subject to seizure for violation of law, 
stopping to check the driver's license or 
the registration of the automobile are 
unreasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment". 
Id. at 63. 
With the PROUSE precedent, an uncorroborated, unidentified 
informant's tip cannot consitute the sole justification for Officer 
Boyle's detention of the defendant and Larry Martinez. Rather, 
there must be an indication of reliability to the uncorroborated 
tip. The source of the information must be reliable and the report 
must contain enough objective facts to justify pursuit and 
detention of the defendant. See CAMPBELL v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, 
DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, 644 P.2d 1219 (Wash. App. 1982); STATE v. 
SIELER, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980). The Court held "in 
the absence of any corroborative information or observation, a 
police officer is not authorized to stop a vehicle on the sole basis 
that a passing motorist points to a vehicle and announces that it is 
being driven by a drunk driver." CAMPBELL ED. at 1220. 
In the instant case, there was no underlying factual justi-
fication given by the informants to conclude the defendant was 
driving under the influence of alcohol. 
The Washington Court held there must be indicia of reliability 
to the uncorroborated tip. The source of information must be 
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reliable and the report must contain enough objective facts to 
justify pursuit and detention of the suspect. 
Under the Washington Court analysis, there must be some under-
lying factual justification for the informants conclusion so the 
officer can make an independent analysis of the informants 
reliability. This helps to prevent investigatory dententions that 
are made on the basis of a tip provided by an honest informant who 
miscontures innocent conduct. 
Here the informant1s tip was conclusionary in nature and also 
failed to provide the objective facts to justify the detention of 
the defendant. The facts were: it is not against the law to drink 
and drive in the State of Utah; to ask directions to the liquor 
store; the defendant was not identified as the individual who had 
just left the Maverick Store intoxicated (4) (21); the vehicle was 
parked when Officer Boyle detained the Defendant and Larry 
Martinez (5) (23) ; Officer Boyle did not observe the Defendant drive 
the vehicle to or from the parking lot nor did he have actual 
knowledge as to who was driving or did drive the vehicle (28)(29); 
Officer Boyle did not question the informant for any underlying 
information to determine why the informant concluded the individual 
was intoxicated so he could make an independent analysis of the 
informant's reliability; and Officer Boyle did not observe any 
erratic driving pattern of the vehicle. 
Therefore, the informant's tip was conclusionary in nature 
and failed to provide the objective facts to justify the stop and 
detention of the Defendant. Even those Courts which have upheld 
an arrest challenged on probable cause based on an informant's tip 
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have required the informant have personal knowledge of the under-
lying facts and have an established credibility. See EFFENBECK v. 
STATE, 700 P.2d 811 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
Officer Boyle admitted he did not know the informants (2)(22) 
and the facts show he did not question the informants to establish 
their credibility. In AGUILAR v. TEXAS, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) the 
Court employed a two-pronged test for informants. First, the 
informant must have personal knowledge of the underlying facts. 
Second, the credibility of the informants must be established. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE CALIBRATION AND TESTING FOR ACCURACY OF THE INTOXILYZER WAS NOT 
PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE 
COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
§41-6-44.3 U.C.A. codifies the findings necessary to establish 
the proper foundation for the introduction of intoxilyzer.evidence. 
The legislature recognized the unusual acceptance of the reliabili-
ty of such evidence. See-PEOPLE v. GOWER, 42 N.Y. 2d 117, 366 N.E. 
2d 69 (1977). The enactment of §41-6-44.3 was an intent by the 
legislature to relieve the State of Utah and other governmental 
entities of the financial burden of calling as a witness in every 
DUI case the public officer responsible for testing the accuracy 
of the intoxilyzer. 
In place of the public officer's testimony, §41-6-44.3 permits 
the admission of affidavits regarding the maintenance of a specific 
intoxilyzer machine and its accuracy. However, prior to the . 
acceptance of those affidavits to establish *a presumption of the 
validity of the test results, §41-6r44.3 requires an affirmative 
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finding by the trial court that: (emphasis added) 
1. The calibration and testing for accuracy of the 
intoxilyzer were performed in accordance with 
the standards established by the Commissioner 
of Public Safety (emphasis added). 
2. The affidavits were prepared in the regular 
course of the public officer's duties. 
3. That they were prepared contemporaneously 
with the act, condition and event. 
4. The source of information from which made 
and the method and circumstances of their 
preparation were such as to indicate their 
trustworthiness. 
The prosecution, to meet this burden, normally submits to 
the Court: 
1. State of Utah Department of Public Safety 
Custodian Certificate/ and 
2. Utah Department of Public Safety Record of 
Intoxilyzer Test and affidavits showing the 
calibration and testing for accuracy of the 
intoxilyzer were performed in accordance with 
the standards established by the Commissioner 
of Public Safety. One affidavit shows the 
date the intoxilyzer was checked prior to 
Defendant's arrest and the other shows the 
date the intoxilyzer was checked subsequent 
to Defendant's arrest. 
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The affidavits establish a rebuttable presumption the intoxi-
lyzer was functioning properly. 
The standards established by the Department of Public Safety 
are published in the Department of Public Safety, Breath Testing 
Regulations, Revised July 1, 1986, Archives file #8387 .which a 
copy was submitted as exhibit "B" into evidence. The procedure for 
checking calibration and certification of the Intoxilyzer are 
found in Paragraph IV (1) through (7). 
Defense counsel objected to the admissions of the Utah Depart-
ment of Public Safety Record of Intoxilyzer Test and affidavit on 
the grounds the affidavit did not comply with the standard as set 
forth in Paragraph IV (5) which states: (15)(48 to 55): 
"FIXED ABSORPTION CALIBRATOR CHECK: With 
the test card in the printer, run a test 
on the fixed absorption calibrator to see 
that the instrument gives the-correct 
reading on the digital display and the 
printed test card. THIS CHECK NOT RE-
QUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS NOT EQUIPPED WITH 
THE FIXED ABSORPTION CALIBRATOR." 
The Utah Department of Public Safety Record of Intoxilyzer 
Test and affidavit records submitted to show the intoxilyzer was 
operating properly before and after Defendant's intoxilyzer test 
show this particular intoxilyzer to have a fixed absorption 
calibrator. Under the paragraph, "THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE:" 
have the "yes" block checked. The fixed absorption calibrator 
teet is the fifth block down under this paragraph. This block 
states: 
"Fixed absorption calibrator (if equipped) 
(Reads within +1/-.01 of calibration setting." 
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The affidavit is not in compliance with the State standard 
set by the Commissioner of Public Safety to show the intoxilyzer was 
properly calibrated and working properly. The State standard 
requires the digital read-out of the instrumentand the printed test 
card to match. The affidavit is not in compliance by allowing a 
+1/-.01 variance between the digital read-out of the instrument and 
the printed test card. For the Court to allow the affidavits into 
evidence is reversible error and the affidavits should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE AFFIDAVITS PROFFERED AS EVIDENCE IN SATISFACTION OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF §41-6-44.3 ARE INADMISSIBLE 
Subargument 1 
The affidavits show on their face the affiant did not attest 
from his own personal knowledge 
In MURRAY CITY v. HALL, No. 17329 Utah Supreme Court (1983) 
the Court states: 
"Moreover, the affidavits proffered as evidence 
in satisfaction of the requirements ao §41-6-44.3 
are inadmissible because they show on their face 
that affiants do not attest from their own 
personal knowledge." 
Footnote 5 states: 
"The dissent suggest that the affiants do attest 
from personal knowledge. The affidavits state 
that the breathalyzer "Was properly checked 
according to the standards established by the 
Utah Department of Public Safety. . ." Nowhere 
do the affiants state their basis for that 
statement. They do not state that they person-
ally performed the testing. Absent such a state-
ment the affidavits are inadequate." 
This case mirrors MURRAY CITY v. HALL. The Utah Department 
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of Public Safety Record of Intoxilyzer Test and affidavits admitted 
into evidence by the Court states: 
"I/We, the undersigned, being first duly sworn 
states that: 
1. Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, 
Serial dumber 94001070 located at Bountiful 
was properly checked by me/us in the course 
of official duties, on 6 April 1989 at 1305 
p.m. 
2. This was done by a currently certified 
technicial and according to the standards 
established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety." 
The affidavit is absent a statement the affiant personally 
performed the testing. The Court allowing the*affidavits to be 
admitted into evidence is reversible error. The affidavits are 
inadmissible unde^ the standards set by MURRAY CITY v. HALL and 
lacked the proper foundation required by §41-6-44.3. 
Subargument 2 
The affidavits are inaccurate 
The affidavits are inadmissible for the reason the affidavits 
are not accurate. 
Paragraph 3 of the affidavits state: 
"This is the official record and notes of 
this procedure which were made at the time 
these t^sts were done." 
The affiant testifies the certified technician performed a 
"Fixed Absorption Calibration test." 
After defense motioned the Court for suppression of the main-
tenance recdrds fc>r non-compliance with the standards set by the 
Commissioner of Piiblic Safety (49), the prosecution was allowed to 
reopen its case, over defense objection(58), and call Bountiful 
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Police Officer Lloyd Killpack to testify the intoxilyzer used in 
this case was not equipped with a Fixed Absorption Calibrator(55). 
However, Officer Killpack testified this intoxilyzer had the 
capablility for a fixed absorption calibrator test. The test could 
not be run because the intoxilyzer did not have the crystal that 
is fixed with the machine by serial number (60). 
The affidavits admitted into evidence show the fixed absorption 
test as having been performed. Therefore, the affidavits are 
inaccurate and inadmissible under the standards set by MURRAY CITY v. 
HALL and the Court allowing the affidavits to be admitted into 
evidence is reversible error. 
Subarqument 3 
The affidavits lack an affirmative finding by the trial 
court as required by §41-6-44.3 
The trial court in allowing the affidavits into evidence did 
mot make an affirmative finding in accordance with the requirements 
of §41-6-44.3; to wit: 
1. The calibration and testing for accuracy 
of the intoxilyzer were performed in 
accordance with the standards established 
by the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
2. The affidavits were prepared in the regular 
course of the public officers duties. 
3. That they were prepared contemporaneously 
with the act, condition and event. 
4. The source of information from which made 
and the method and circumstances of their 
preparation were such as to indicate their 
trustworthiness. 
The Court did not make this affirmative finding and allowed 
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the affidavits into evidence (62) (72). For the Court not to make 
the affirmative finding is reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, protects individuals from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. The police must have probable cause to stop and 
question the driver of a car for suspicion of driving under the 
influence. An unidentified informant's uncorroborated tip on an 
indivudual driving under the influence of alcohol is not sufficient 
probable cause for the police to stop and detain the individual 
without the officer's observation of an erratic driving pattern. 
The tip must contain enough articuable facts to justify pursuit and 
detention of the suspected driver. There must be some underlying 
facts for the informant's conclusion so the officer can make an 
independent analysis of the informant's reliablity. The informant's 
credibility must be established. The detention of Defendant and 
subsequent arrest lacked the requisite probable cause and was there-
for an unreasonable search and seizure. 
The affidavits proffered as evidence in satisfaction of the 
requirements of §41-6-44.3 were inadmissible because they show on 
their face the affiant did not attest from his own personal know-
ledge; the affidavits were inaccurate showing a fixed absorption 
calibration test had been run but testimony showed the intoxilyzer 
was incapable of running a fixed absorption calibration test for 
lack of a crystal; and the Court did not make the affirmantive 
finding as required by §41-6-44.3. 
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Therefore, the trial court's verdict of guilty should be 
reversed and remanded to the trial court for dismissal on lack of 
probable cause. Suppressing the intoxilyzer records for non-
compliance with the standards set by the Commissioner of Public 
Safety; the affiant did not attest from his own personal knowledge; 
the affidavits are inaccurate and the trial court failed to make 
an affirmative finding as required by §41-6-44.3. 
DATED this / Q _ day of August, 1989. 
ARON STANTQN, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify on this / 0 day of August, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed, 
postage prepaid, first class, U.S. Mail to: 
Russell L. Mahan 
Bountiful City Prosecutor 
74 5 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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1 NDEX 
DEPONENT 
MIKE BOYI.E 
EXAMINATION BY; 
KE-EXAMINATION BY: 
MR. MAHAN 
MR. STANTON-
MR. MAHAN 
Ll.OYD KILf.PACK 
EXAMINATION BY MR. MAHAN 
UJIS MAESTAS 
EXAMINATION BY MR. STANTON 
MR- MAHAN 
LAKRY MARTTNEZ 
EXAMINATION BY MR. STANTON 
MR- MAHAN 
0O0-
2b 
I In tU# M*i*er of iuitt |*$* M*e§*tf**| 
GLBRK: Court i*» now in a e» t* * | p q with the 
Monur*!*.}*. 8, Murk JohMPpn presM<*lny* 
THI COURT: You §*«*y £>* »#**ted, 
REPORTER: Docket |*o. 8 8 2 ~ M M - *M*> * i * 
the tJjRitf #©t |pr tr|«i| for hul* M3#**l£#..' 
TBI COURT; The record should ©how that 
Mr, Mdhdn i& present for t toe c i t y 41 torney , mn4 
Mr. Aroti Stanton for th* defendant The dfffcndant 
U also present, Tlri$ City ia r$c*dy* Mr. M^lmO? 
MR. MAHAN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT; The defense is* re*$4y? 
MR. STANTON- We're ready, your Honor V 
THM COURT: Do *# h*tv^  an intprm^ttQ^ 
here? 
MR. M A H A N : ye$
 t \ ihought t|^| h*d b#«a 
previously filed, but Officer Boyle .-•*: *¥ • I I tvrff &r 
him in. 
THE COURT: Do you aoleinnly **i*e<ir t M 
allegation* of this Information C|ty versus Masstas* 
are true and correct or you hav# yood and just 
causae to believe ar^ true and correct. 
MR. BOYLE; I $Q. 
THE qoURT: Doe§ Mr. Stiantron |>ay* 3 P#py Pf 
t h i » 7 
(Examination by Mr N'ahan) 
MR, MAHAN: Yea, I think ] g«*ve hi* «* copy 
when ha cap* in today. 
THE COURT: Very w-e J J , Mr. Mahal), you **y 
make your opening statement or --
MR, MAHAN: J1 11 forego any opening 
statement, yo**r Honor, 
THE COURT; Call your firs! witneaa. 
MR. MAHAN: The City cajla Officer Suyl*. 
MIKE BOYLE, 
being fira* duly f*wom, way deposed 
and testified a** follows; 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAHAN: 
Q, Would you pleaae state your na«e and 
occupat ion. 
A* Mike Boyle, police officer for Bountiful 
C i t y • 
Q* And were you workiny at* <* police officer 
at about 3:46 or 10 on thf afternoon of. the 2.8t|j of 
April, 19*8? 
A Yea , I wa** • 
Q. And w e r e you on dhtly on t h a t u u c a w i o n ? 
A . Y e a , | w a s . 
Q. Now, on \\\+\ d«*le d i d you c o i « in c o n t a o t 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
6 
7 
a 
9 
JO 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2ft 
(Sx4uin<irion by Mr Mah«n) 
with Luih Maest^a? 
A. Y«9, X did. 
Q. And did ihi$» incident occur within the 
pity ll»it«> at Bountiful? 
A* ¥es, it did. 
Q,* What e^i'tf i'm doiny ju&r prior c^* the ti»$ 
you ca*e ii» contact with Mr* Maestaa? 
A. I initially w<*t» on a traffic etop 4 a 
separate traffic stop. i Wdt, i*>*iiinu a citation fcp 
that driver 
Q, And where wis th«*t lor- n lion? 
A. That waa at Five Points Mall, l&OO South 
Nain SI reef • 
Q. And what happened «t thai, time? 
A* At that i iioe I w*# approached b¥ two 
yepdrale citizens dt separate times, being advised 
by the citi'^eny that there wa* an individual that 
bad juet left the Maverick store tb«*t was 
intoxicated apd had beep driving ~~ or N*b 4rivir>g« 
<*nd he alao a^ked for dirpption* toward* the liquor 
mtore . 
MR. STANTON: Objection to the testimony, 
your Honor, heare<*y 
TUB COUftT; \ th jnk that uuiei be n u n t ^ i n e d 
1 I (Examin0l Jon by Mr Mahan) 
2 In the for» th**t ii w«$e I H I c i U d l hepe, 
3 Q. It is hearsay, but what I'm -- well, I'll 
4 J briny it up l«*ter for puarppHen of probable cause* 
ft but in any event J f l | forego that for the time 
6 being. After you talked to the cit iz«n« ( what did 
? J you do? 
8 J A. I responded down toward* (he cired of the 
9 I I iquor utore. 
10 J Q* And what did you find there? 
11 *• At the liquor etQr# i ioc*i#(j a y^hjlc}* 
12 ttrttchinu thif deerript ion piv/en lo me by the 
13] citizens 
14 1 Q- And what did you do then? 
15 j A I pulled up alongside of the vehicle. J 
%6 I *ade contact with the driver A* i wa.s pulling 
17 j Into the parking lot, the .driver had juet gotten 
18 I into I be driver1** Mitl» of I he vehicle. 
19 J Q. Je thin the liquor &,tore in Bountiful? 
20 A* Ve$ ( it |a. 
21 j Q The ^ U t e liquor el or*? 
22 I A. Yew. 
23 J Q, Aod 4id you **ee iho®e individuals* prior to 
24 1 the time they got in the car, or were they ju»* 
25 1 yet ting inta the car a t the I Itpe you *aw them? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
(Examination by Mr. Mahan) 
A. He waa just, get liny into the c«ir at the 
t1 in & that T located the vehicle. 
Q. And was it in the parking. Jot area of the 
liquor store? 
A. Yes, |t wa$. 
Q. Okay, and as you pulled in, what happened 
then? 
A- I pu|l#d up alongside the vehicle, on the 
passenger's side of the vehicle. At that tiwe, % 
noticed that the engine to the vehicle, was 
running. X made pont<*d with the driver of the 
white pick-up truck. 
y o u ? 
Q And w«*& -~ tir d i d lie- i d e n t i f y h i m ^ w l f t o 
A, Y e s , h e d i d . 
Q. How did he do that? 
A. J believe it. wat* with <*-ut<ih driver'* 
1i cense. 
Q. ^y what name did he identify himself? 
A. Puis Maes I as, 
Q. And was that the -- where was he -- was hi 
seated in the driver's seat behind the steering 
wheel at the t;i»e you appro*c*hed hin»? 
A • Yes, he was. 
< . I' I- ( »«r. i ) -\h^-79*=»«J 
J I I examine t ton by »r. Mahan) 
2 I Q, And wht?n you approached him and he 
3 identified himself, then what happened? 
4 J A. At* he spoke to me, i delected n strong 
6 1 pdor Qf alcohol coming from his breath 
* Q. And so, what did you do? 
7 A. At that ti«t? 1 asked him if he would 
8 1 submit to a few field sobriety fpate. 
9 <J • And did he agree to do that? 
10 J A > ye®, he did * 
11 J Q. And where were those te«ts performed? 
12 J A, in Ibe liquor store |»«irkuiy lot < «*lpug#ld£ 
13 rhe vehicle. 
14 J Q» And what dfd you ask him to do? 
16 J A*. The flrat rest I asked was the alphabet 
16 J test, starting with the letter J
 # finishing with 
17 the lei ter R. 
18 1 Q* And did he do -~ what did he do in 
19 J performing that teist? 
?0 A. The firwt «*ltampt4 Mr* Mae^ta« started 
21 J with the letter H and continued to the letter Z, 
22 1 completing the alphabet- I asked Mr, Maef*t«*a if f^ e 
23 understood the directions to the test* #nd asked 
24 I him if he would repeat the lest after explaining 
25 I the instructions. 
16 
1 I (Col lo<juy ) 
2 | prepared in the ordinary course of*duties. That 
3 J they were prepared contemporaneously jtfith the 
4 I testing, and that the source of information which 
5 made and the method of ci pcMms t ancea of their 
6 preparation is such as to indicate that th«y're 
7 j trustworthy. 
8 1 THE COURT; Mr, Stanton, do you wi$h to be 
9 J heard? 
10 MH. STANTQM; T do, yuiir Honor* We«re 
li J going to object to the admissions of those tests on 
J2 I several grounds. Number one will be on probable 
13 1 cause, which weJll bring out in.cross examination, 
14 I which was not probable cause in the beginning to 
I5j stop the driver in this case and snake the arreet. 
16 j And as such then, there would be a motion far t$*e 
17 1 suppression any subs>e<juent testing after that. 
10 j Second reason is th«*t on the i n i ox i 1 4 *«r checklist* 
19 any machine that has a fixed --
20 I THE COURT: Sorry. 1 don't have the 
21 checklist before me, What exhibit number is that? 
22 I MR, MAHAN; I'll go ahead and make the 
23 motion, then, that %h& City elsomoves to admit 
24 Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 and C 
26 1 MP. STAMTOM; Of course, we object t% that. 
\ 
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1 ( E x a m i n a t i o n by Mr. S U u t o n ) 
2 J Q. Ancl you w e r e a p p r o v e b e d by two c i t i z e n s ? 
3 A . Yen 
4 j Q. And they told you thfre W H S an individual 
5 at the Maverick atore seeking direct innw to the 
h state* 1 irjuor store? 
7 A . Yet* . 
Bj Q< And they told you that he was drunk? 
9 A. Yes . 
10 Q, And driving a vehicle? 
M l A Yes 
12 1 Q, And other than tfiat, i !•«• only other 
13 information they gave you wds. i he licence number of 
14 I the truck? 
1 •) A . No . 
1 ft J Q • Okay . Did they give y>m add i H nria 1 
17 i nformat i on? 
IB I A. Yes. 
19 Q. Not*, prior to these people approaching 
20j yoUi did you know them before? 
2 1 A. Mo* 
22 J Q. So then* they would not be 4 police 
23 1 informant, as we know, i\\ terms of police 
24 informants? 
25 No 
22 
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(Examination by Mr. Stanton) 
Q. They were juat citiis»*«« "off the street? 
A. Ye». 
MR. STANTON: If the Court will bear with 
me just one moment, I've lost a ahetst
 uf iguestions 
that I had. 
Q. Now* and I would based upon your 
testimony, assume that the tip was unsolicited. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, prior -- or let »e restate thi«. Da 
you know the informant's identity? 
A. No. 
Q. Therefore, you do- not know what the 
informant's past history is? 
A . No . 
Q, And you don't know if th* informant has a 
history of supplying unreliable or reliable 
informa11 on? 
A. J assume you're talking about.two 
c11 i*ens . 
Q. Okay, the question goes to both of them. 
A. Okay. No, I don't. 
Q. Now, at the M»«.» did y<»u finish upNyour 
traffic stop? 
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( Examina r ion by Mr $iaiilan) 
A. Yte**f J did 
<J. And then you proceeded to the vicinity of 
the lji|uur «tore looking for the vehicle? 
A Vo*. 
Q. And when you found I h** vi-hlcle, it Wc<# 
parked in th^ r parking lot? 
A. ¥ee. 
Q, Wc*9 there an individual in the vehicle? 
A » if e s • 
Q. W«-i« the vehicle running? 
A. At the t i *n e of tiQulapt , ye*. 
Q. Any time epnn — any significant tl<?te $paf) 
between the tli&e you sighted the vehicle £n the 
parking lot and the time that you approached iJ. an4 
pulled up alongside of hlw? 
A . No . 
Q. So, It's possible the engine wae running 
at the time you pulled up? 
A. Jl's possible. 
Q. Were both -~ way there someone fitting 
behind the wheel of the 4?J v e r'9 seett and someone 
sitting on the passenger's side? 
A. At initial contact, yea, 
Q. And do you recall "If they were- t a l M n g to 
28 
i| (Examination by Mr* Stanton) 
2 1 answers, I thii^k, in tftis H o u of <|ueat lonlnq , You 
3 stated that ypu did talk to the passenger in tl>s 
41 vehicle at a later time* 
8 A- Yea, 
6 J Q. And when was that time? 
7| A. After Hr. Maestas had been placed under 
a arrest. 
9 Q ; And what was the substance of your 
10 I conversation with the passenger? 
tl A, As I recall, it was hasie«*Jly just his 
12 J name and date of birth. 
13 Q. And do you recall what his name is? 
14 j A. f*arry Martinet. 
15 J Q« Is he in the courtroom? 
16 A* I believe h^'s the gentleman In the back 
17 1 there, 
If* Q, And that was the only source of 
19 information you solicited from him, was hi* n*$m& 
20 I and address? 
2 11 A• As I reed]1. 
22 j Q. Where in the process did you decide mr- J#*t 
23 1 me back up. Pid you ever see Mr. M a s s e s drive th# 
24 J vehicle? 
25 1 A. No, the vehicle w«*e never observed In 
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(Examination by Mr. Stanton) 
not Ion. 
Q. And at* far as your knowledge 49 fro who 
actually was driving or di-d drive the vehicle 
there, or even would have driven the vehicle away 
from there, could either have been Mr, Maastaa or 
Mr. Martinez, baaed on your observations? 
A. J could not specifically say, no. 
Q. In other ward**, you do not know really 
whether Mr. Maestas or Mr. M<*r t ineje, which one of 
the two really drove the vehicle into the parking 
lot? 
A. No, I don't know. 
Q. Your report states that signs ur 
complaints of injury or Illness is none, Is that 
based upon observation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The only question you asked about any 
illnesses, one of physical nature, would result in 
the answer about the injured knee, Jw that currpot? 
A. I asked about the appendages on the 
bottom, inclusive of the h«*nd« and arms. 
Q. Did you completely fill out this for#? ?» 
this all of your work? 
A. " Old I -- yew . 
*^ 1 rt *•> e\ 
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3 then to counsel table. 
3 MI. STANTON: No, :pm ju*t wanting to see. 
4 1 lie * re going to object to Exhibits D and B being 
Si admitted, which would also throw out 1 and P If* the 
61 Court accepts it. 
7 THE COURT: Yes, they would hinge on these* 
$ HW* STANTON; Now, if you look on the 
9 public safety record o|i intoxiliser test, an 
10J affidavit, there is a bjopjc i-- one, two, three, 
111 four ~~ five blocks down that's called a fixed 
12 absorption celibrater test if tscjuijped read|s within 
13 1 plus or minus <01 of calibration setting, Now, 
14 1 that block i* checked, meaning it had a fixed 
16j absorption calibrater test. % will have to provide 
)6j the regulation to the Cour$ because my associate 
17! has it in another court using, it on another pase 
1$J TH$ COURT: We have those regs, don't we? 
19 j Mr. Mah«*n, you have them as you indicated before. 
20 MR. STANTON: No, there1* one add!tion that 
21 needs to go to thie# and J1!! provide the Qourt, 
22 J but the motion or the background for th4» is the 
23 I Department of Public Safety is responsible for 
24 I developing these regs and guidelines on which f°r 
36 I the calibration of the pacbin*, thm qualification 
\ 
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2 I of the officerf every other thing that cornea under 
3 J this area of driving under the influence that is 
4 I being used in a court of law. Department of Public 
5 Safety is responsible for putting forth guidelines, 
8 I will provide the Court with the regulation th&t 
?J **#e put out by the Department of Public Safety that 
8 J ~~ and the Department. 
9 I One pther comment., The Department of 
to I Pub l ic Sa fe ty , i f t h e y ' r e r e s p o n s i b l e for p i j t t ing 
11 J them out, they're al$o responsible* for having to 
12 J follow their own guidelines, and that*s th«g 
13 cornerstone on which this motion is being made-
14 J That in a regulation tfll provide a copy of to the 
j§J Court, it says in there that under the fi*ed 
16 1 absorption calibration test, there is not a waiver 
17 J factor of plus or minns • 01* It states that th«y 
18 J both must match up. The readout #nd the printout 
19 1 must match as to exactly what it if. There is no 
20 I tolerance allowed plus or minus ,Q|. They've got 
2lj it on this, the regulation require^ no tolerates 
22 whatsoever. I1!! provide that to the Court, 
23 I So, based upon that, J would move th$t the* 
24 1 machine or the maintenance records not be admitted} 
25 1 into evidence# and as such, then the others would 
t>0 
)I (ColJoquy) 
2 also go out. 
3 THU COURT: Mr t Mohan's ~~ he doesn't have 
4 I the up-to-date rega; is that what you* re spying? 
5I Mi. STANTON: There's one other regs, and 
6 J I1!! provide it with Mr. Metier*, that was put out by 
7 1 the pepctrtinent of Public safety, Of course, tbe 
8 1 Defense has no objections on getting this to you 
9 1 and then letting you make your decision at that 
10 time* Mr, Mahan has an opportunity to respond 
1l| also. 
12 THE COURT? If your motion is denie<$# you 
13j don't have to present any evidence 
14 MR, STANTON: Ye#, I <Jo, 
15 MR. MAHAN; Your Honor, I have the 
16 certified copy of breath testing regulations frop 
17 October 1987. This w«*s in April of 1988, and thi£ 
18 1 is the most recent copy of the regulations. It has 
19 1 been furnished to me by the Commissioner of Public 
20 Safety. 
21 TWi COURT: lift »e t«*ke a look at t^at. 
22 MR, MAHAN: Okay, the only thing that this 
23 reg has is talking about fh* certification of t^« 
24i machine Itself to place and use, What we're 
25 J talking about is at th* time of the use of the 
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(Colloquy \ 
machine, the calibrations that are being made at 
that point In time to determine that it's meriting 
accurately, So, we've got -- we're essentially 
talking about two different things here. We mould 
object to that being admitted into evidence. 
THE COURT: I'm having trouble following 
you, Mr. Stanton. You're paying that this reg that 
you're concerned about here requires a test be made 
at the time the test is run on the subject here? 
MR. STANTON: Okay, the only th4ng 
mentioned in this reg, |« that at the time the 
machine itself is placed into use to be used for 
intoxilizer tests <-<-
THE COURT: Placed in the police 
department. 
MR. STANTON; Right, it must meet a certain 
calibration. Here we're saying tha.t under the 
regs, that they are required after so many tests or 
after a certain period of time, th* machine must be 
recalibrated to determine its accuracy. This test 
for certification calls for a different standard. 
The teat for the maintenance test in the machine to 
simulate is reliable cause for a different 
standards particularly on the fined absorption 
\ 
J-. * » i u A .. •/ a iQ 
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2 J calibrator. Therefore, we're talking <*bout apples 
3 J and oranges. These regs versus the reg I'}! also 
4 1 provide you with. 
5 THE COURT; But you don't have the reg witft 
6 you: is that correct? 
7 MR. STANTON: Unfortunately no. There's* 
a only limited copies, and X'can't provide one to the 
9 Court. 
tO THK COURT: Mr. Mohan? 
11 MR. MAHAN: Your Honor, the most recent 
12 I copy th«*t we have of the breath testing 
13 regulations, we move to adroit as Plaintiff's 
14 Exhibit .0. 
15 THE COURT; You say there's something more 
16 1 recent than that, Counselor Stanton? 
17 MR. STANTON: Okay, this is the reg that 
18 I I'm talking about. X mould have no objection to 
19 1 this being admitted. Under paragraph 5 it states, 
20 I "fixed absorption calibrater check; With the test 
21 part in the printer, run a test on the fixed 
22 absorption calibrater to see that the instrument is 
23 the correct reading on the digital display and the 
34 printed test card." It says it has to match. T\\« 
2p \ maintenance form that we're talking about here 
53 
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2 I rtllowa <* vdriance of plus or minus Qi. The elate 
3 I regs s^ys that they muat watch. 
4 MR. MAHAN: Could we jet that into evidence 
6 1 first, and then J'4 like to *pe<*k to it. 
.6 MR STANTON: 1 hav* no objection to that 
'/ J be ing adipi t ted . 
8 I THE COURT: Received. This rheek not 
9 I required regs noi equipped to the, fixed absorption 
JO I calibrator, if not, i«U use it, l don't know why 
lj the highway patrol usee It in some areas, bu< not 
12 J in others. 
13 MR. S T A K T O N ; And in Ibis case it does have 
14 1 the calibrater-
15 I MR, MAHAN: May X see that? 
Itol THE COURT: It do^tiP ' t mention plus of 
17 J minus .01 in the rerjH. it'n really equipment 
18 I there, Mr. Mahan. 
19 I MR. MAHAN; Well, it does in the following 
20 I paragraph on the simulator ch*ck. "Run three tests 
?1 I end observe to see that I he correct readings are 
22 I within plus or minus .01 of the actual value,, «s 
23 indicated.M 
24 I THE COURT: Where is that? 
2f> 1 MR. MAHAN: It's in the next paragraph 
M 
(CoJloquy| 
down
 t 
THE COURT: J didn't read that* 
MR* STANTON; That'a a different teat, yom* 
Honor• 
THE COURT; That's for the simulator check* 
rather than fi#ed ^biMirption calibrator. 
MR. STANTON: Tb* calibration ia f$r the 
calibration of the equipment itself, Jt has 
nothing to do with the following test, which into 
aee that whether or not. what they uee *f a breath 
sample would determine thai it fails* within that 
.001 or ,002. Tf you1!! ioojt --
THB COURT: Paragraph 5 pertain* to fixed 
absorption? calibrator teat, and it doesn't mention 
the .01. The next one, the simulator check --
MR. STANTON: Which if you'll look (an the 
maintenance record ia atep No. 4*f zero set gero 
indicator and printer check. Zero vet of .00, 
.001. Those are two different checks on this 
machine. 
THE COURT: Jt appears that he doea have a* 
point here, Mr, Mahan. The thing that concern** th« 
Court i» in some areas the aimulator wouldn't even 
be on the machine- l% pould be ignored completelyf 
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2 1 but because i t f s there, then you're held to $hie 
3 I s t a n d a r d . That c o n c e r n s this Court, kef's take a 
4 J recess for five m i n u t e a . 
5 I (Recede taken) 
6 COURT CkBRK: Court will come to ordep <ind 
7 1 resume in session* 
» I THE C O U R T : You may be seated. The record 
9 I should show that d e f e n s e counsel 4a present, The 
10 I city a t t o r n e y ie looking for ( i n a u d i b l e ) . 
11 j Mr. Mahan, J c o n t e m p l a t e you•re about to make a 
12 m o t i o n to reopen, is that correct? 
13 Mil- MAHAN: Yes, with respect to the issue 
14 1 that he has raised pn the affidavit* the City 
I6j p r o p o s e s to call O f f i c e r Lloyd &i}lp*ick of the 
16 1 Bountiful P o l i c e Department* 
17 1 THE C O U R T : Do you wibb to be heard on tftat 
18 J Nr* S t a n t o n ? 
19 1 MR* STANTOH: I might make one other 
30 I o b s e r v a t i o n to the Court if J may, your Honpr, and 
21 J this m**y resolve what we're talking about very 
32 1 quickly, b e c a u s e there le a U1<*h Supreme Court 
33 J ruling on this In the s p e c i f i c s . if you will, 
24 I n o t i c e that the instrument cher* th#t was done on 
2 6 | T March ~- n^iv^r mind. 
6» 
(ColloquyI 
or the City having rested, now wants to reopen, I 
think that in the interest u)f justice and lair 
play, that tha Court should allow thia> We're ftfra 
to get at the truth* plafra here to bey that 
justice is done, and not to preside over a game of 
tricks, if I can use that enpression-
Mil, STANTON: Hell, your Honor, If J may 
address that, we•re not talking about tricks. 
Wefre talking about tha Defendants right in this 
litter under both the St^tK and the Federal 
Const i tut ion • 
THE COURT: Who is Defendant's right hera 
because of a technical nature, 
MR, STANTON: let me add this to the Pourtf 
than. If the Court 4a going to do this vyith ah 
officer who i© going to testify that there is no 
fined absorption calibrater on the machine, why 
Isn't the officer who did the maintenance check **~ 
he's the one that should be called in and atata aa 
to why ha checked tha block "yes", 
THE COURT: Well, he's jr^ t here bacauwe it 
was not anticipated. TJie objection is pvarrulad. 
The State may ~~ tha City reopen. Tha racord may 
note the objection of tha Defense. 
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2 1 Q. And doe« the Bountiful intoxilj^er have 
3j all of the parts that are required to perform the 
4 t eat? 
6 1 A. It doe* not. 
6 Q, What doesn't it have? 
7 1 A, It doe« nu( h*ve 4 crystal that is fixed 
8 1 with the machine by serial number, 
* MR. MAHAN: That1** all, your Honur . 
10 Ml. STANTQW; Are you certified to perform 
11 maintenance op this machine? 
12 A. J a$ not . 
13 1 MB, STANTON; We? have nq quest}on$4 your 
J 4 j Honor * 
15 1 THE COURT: Anything further? 
16 I MR, MAHAN; No, nothing further. 
H THE COURT; you may step down, 
18 MR. MAHAN: May I s$*eak to this matter? 
19j THE OQURT: Yes, you may, 
20 MR. MAHAN: The City request© that the 
21 Court deny the ~- or overrule the objection of the 
22 1 Defense concerning this. What it &<$y& un th« 
23 1 affidavit is, * '"The following testa were made, yew 
24 | or no. Fixed absorption calihfa^er test, if 
2$ 1 equipped11 w¥esM was checked. If \ he checking of 
M 
not -ny ehread of evidence ln«t It wis equipped 
he'* *ryiny| to #«l»tl into evidence «• repord *h**i 
utrttwH th«*t 4* 4e equi|»p<*d W« don't have $o brin^ 
anybody 4n to ehow ther 4t.4« pr 41 iwn'l.. Qna* 
*g«*in, we renew pur o)>j«cUon> on t-ti4•# • 
THI COURT; The #hre«d of *v4denc« i* th« 
document iteeif. 
Mil, 8TAUTPU; Tn#t'# corrupt, 
TH1 COURT: It ca»»4d be Interpreted fch** 
w«y. The objection u overruled. 8*h4b4$f P #»4 V 
ere rtfii«jv«4. Anything fwyth«T, Mr M<th«*n? 
MR. MAHA*. The City *>,ks the Court »P 
«d»4* the «-r 
THK COURT; Well, «!1 right. 6 end, C *re 
*)«o received, ft »«*y hlPtf* on the «*d»i$*iGn fijf 0 
«»nd R. 
MR. MAHAN; And we * ) » o » o v * t o e d l f t i t #., 
» 
the h o t t l e e . 
THi COURT: Other fb*« the eff4<Uw4!. r-
w«l), tni* doeen'1 *PP)y %o the efftdevJt, Pa ypM 
t»«ve *ny other objection* to Exhibit A? 
MR. 8TAMT0H? W* 11, »y obj«Qt4on, Qijcr 
Audio, your Honor, \u |h»t the St«*t« stated. c4e»rly 
to the Court they n#d r*»te4 No further *vf4«f*««>'. 
•HI iminn» 
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2 MR. STANTOif; I • m sorry. I don't mean to 
3 be. I'm stating tli<*t's part of owp ~-
4 THE COURT: You're not being offensive, and 
SJ I hope I didn't sound offensive when J used that 
6 I term« 
7 MR. STANTON: No. 
8 I THg COURT: We realise that constitutional 
9 1 rights cire virtually sacred, and this defendant is 
10 I entitled to all of them, Anything more? 
11 MR. STANTON; No, J think w ^ v e pretty well 
12 J summed it up, faking previous «rem.arks into 
13 I consideration. 
1*1 THI COURT; Thank you. Wei), the Court has 
16| pretty much ruled on these other matters as to the 
16 J integrity pf this affidavit, whether it should be 
17 j admitted or not allowing the defendant to reppen; 
10 I allowing the prosecution %o examine the defendant 
}9 I beyond the scope of direct examination and the 
20 like. 
21 I Opurt finds the defendant guilty* What are 
22 1 your desires as fir as position of bn*ntence is 
29 1 concerned? Maybe I ought to say this at the-
24 I outset . I think that there way be sojpie issues h<pr# 
26 1 that we could all benefit from appellate direction. 
